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THE STUDENT AS UNIVERSITY RESIDENT
By WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE*
I. A PRELIMINARY DISTINCTION THAT FAILS
T HE articles in this symposium move through a series of topics
each of which considers a different aspect of the relationship
between the student and the university. This division of topics, dis-
tinguishing the student as a university resident from the student as
a private citizen, virtually implies that useful legal distinctions can
be drawn according to the capacity in which a student may act and the
place within which the university presumes to assert its authority.
Thus, it may be suggested, while the student remains as a resident
within the campus, he is subject to the plenary authority of the uni-
versity which may appropriately restrict academic residency to those
agreeable to its rules. Accordingly, on-campus conduct not in con-
formity with the rules may forfeit the student's residency. On the
other hand, once the student moves away from the campus he acts as
a private citizen bound only by laws applicable to citizens in gen-
eral. Like other unattached citizens, however, he is no longer subject
to any extraterritorial claims of the university whose jurisdiction is
confined to its own precinct, the campus.
The resident-citizen distinction appears to be fair to the student
and fair to the university as well. It releases the student off the
campus from worry that he is less free than other citizens, and it
releases the university from concern that it is less free than other
property owners. If one readily accepts the campus relationship as
one of ownership and tenancy, moreover, the university's claim of
plenary on-campus authority seems to be entirely reasonable and
wholly straightforward. The essential core of property ownership
consists of the power to exclude and the concomitant authority to
expel those who seek to remain in defiance of the owner's rules or
wishes. Where the property is placed in the hands of trustees who
are given legal authority by the state or a private benefactor to pro-
mulgate rules for the general governance of the institution, it is
utterly unremarkable that those who are admitted as academic resi-
dents should expect to abide by all campus rules which condition
their residency. No significant legal problem would appear to arise
so long as the rules are confined to the campus itself and so long
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as they offend no state law or public policy otherwise applicable
to landholders and educational institutions in general. The uni-
versity does not attempt to force anyone to attend, and, unlike the
situation in secondary education, the student is not compelled by law
to matriculate. As a free agent who voluntarily applies and may
just as readily abandon the university whenever he feels like it, the
student resident must reasonably expect to conform to the trustees'
regulations while he is on university property.
If the residential relationship of the student is viewed as one
of contract, involving private agreements respecting access to and
use of campus services and facilities, again we seem to reach the
same result. Indeed, the free market contract model of comparison
is especially attractive because it also provides an answer to those
who would criticize the fairness, and not merely the legality, of
campus rules. Within the free market contract model, for instance,
diversity among colleges and their differing sets of rules is expect-
able and desirable. Competition of colleges offering different aca-
demic life styles maximizes consumer satisfaction by providing a
broad range of alternatives capable of responding to the differing
preferences of the students. A given college rule - whether it re-
quires all students to dress alike, whether it forbids social fraternities,
or something else again - requires no special defense; the success
or failure of the college to attract and to hold students against the
competition of the colleges offering different academic life styles
is itself the best and the only secure measure of the wisdom of its
rules. Certainly this seems eminently sensible, at least where the
college formulates its rules only in terms of on-campus conduct
and does not attempt to extort contractual concessions to rules af-
fecting the off-campus citizenship prerogatives of those who enroll
with it. So long as the legal requisites of a contract are satisfied
(e.g., contractual capacity, mutual assent, conscionability of specific
terms), there would seem to be little basis for a lawyer to reproach
the rules regime of any given college.' Were it not primarily for
1 Yet, while there may be some merit still remaining in treating the legal student-
college relation as one of contract (e.g., where in fact the student could select any
of several different kinds of colleges and where the rules or general conditions of
each are well known to him in advance), this view needs far greater judicial super-
vision than it has received thus far. Typical student cases involving private colleges
have manifested a shocking indifference to a number of considerations which have
tempered the law of contracts even in more commercial fields such as insurance
and sales. See, e.g., University of Miami v. Militana, 184 So. 2d 701 (Dist. Ct. App.
Fla. 1966) ; Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1925) ; Gott v. Berea
College, 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913); Carr v. St. John's Univ., 17 App. Div.
2d 632, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410 (1962) ; Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div. 487,
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certain constitutional protections applicable to students as citizens,
moreover, there would be little amiss were a college to bind its
students contractually to fulfill any number of promises respecting
their off-campus conduct as well.
In both respects - the property analogy and the contract
analogy - the public as well as private universities would thus
appear to possess plenary authority on campus. As Mr. Justice
Holmes observed in rejecting the complaint of a person refused a
permit to speak in the Boston Common and who sought to argue
that the mayor had accordingly violated his freedom of speech:
For the Legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public
speaking in a highway or public park is no more an infringement
of the rights of a member of the public than for the owner of a
private house to forbid it in his house.2
231 N.Y.S. 435 (1928) ; Barker v. Trustees of Bryn Mawr College, 278 Pa. 121, 122
A. 220 (1923).
The rules which a student "contracts" to observe are altogether nonnegotiable,
and there is in fact an absence of bargaining. The majority of "sellers" uniformly
employ a self-serving clause reserving the right to terminate the relation at will
according to standards they unilaterally determine pursuant to a vague "good con-
duct" rule. Thus, the nonnegotiability of terms is compounded by the real lack of
shopping alternatives, the inequality of the parties in fixing terms, parallel practices
among sellers, and the impotency of individual applicants to affect terms. The
contracts are purely on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Frequently, the student has little
idea of the terms of his contract in advance of matriculating, as he more often
than not becomes enrolled before being presented with any sort of handbook which
states the conditions of his attendance. Occasionally, he does not receive the handbook
at all. Its provisions are typically subject to change at the sole pleasure of the
college. Moreover, the student may be a minor when he enrolls, and while he may
thus avoid the contract based on his own incapacity, he may also be unable to
enforce it until he becomes of age.
One might expect, as a consequence, that the courts would be more inclined
than they have been to interpret vague rules against the university as the draftsman
and stronger party and void those rules which appear to be unconscionable. See,
e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Willard Van Dyke Productions, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 N.Y.2d 301, 189
N.E.2d 693, 239 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1963). See also, Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and
Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 603 (1943) ; Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion -
Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943);
Meyer, Contracts of Adhesion and the Doctrine of Fundamental Breach, 50 VA. L.
REv. 1178 (1964) ; Patterson, Compulsory Contracts in the Crystal Ball, 43 COLUM.
L. REv. 731 (1943); Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L REV. 700 (1939).
Compare UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302.
There are still other considerations which strain the private contract model
of student-college relations, even from the college's perspective. Thus, the "consid-
eration" furnished by the student in the form of tuition and fees frequently defrays
less than one-half of the (average) cost of educating him - a fact which simply
underscores the larger fact that colleges are not commercial, profit-seeking under-
takings which deal with students at arm's length. Rather, they may be heavily
subsidized charitable corporations established primarily for the benefit of the
students and administered by trustees. Such a difference in the basic view of the
student-college relationship should incline the courts to look again at the rules
structure to review the decisions of the trustees and their subordinates against a high
standard of fiduciary obligation to the beneficiaries, and not in terms of permissible
clauses in an arm's-length contract. See Goldman, The University and the Liberty of Its
Students -A Fiduciary Theory, 54 Ky. L.J. 643 (1966) ; Seavy, Dismissal of Stu-
dents: "Due Process," 70 HARV. L. REV. 1406 (1957).
2 Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 511, 39 N.E. 113 (1895), afifd, 167 U.S.
43 (1897).
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Similarly, when the state undertakes to establish a college, it may
be seen to operate in the capacity of a proprietor who is subject
only to the usual rules of law respecting the use of his own property
and not subject to constitutional norms which affect him only when
he, acting in a governmental rather than a proprietary capacity, at-
tempts to regulate private conduct removed from his property.
For all of its hoary tradition, however, the on-campus/off-
campus distinction is unsound, and the property or contract analogies
are very insecure as a matter of law." Issues of constitutional law
to one side, the appropriateness of certain rules in an institution pre-
suming to call itself "academic" would still be open to discussion;
surely it is proper to suggest that truly academic institutions serve
special, vital, and limited functions which may be undermined and
disserved by rules which inhibit either academic or nonacademic
freedom either on campus or off campus - rules which are, inci-
dentally, wholly inessential to the orderly operation of a university.
In contemplation of evolved constitutional law, moreover, all such
models are subordinate to constitutional norms whenever the in-
stitution is so significantly aided by government that its rulemaking
authority partakes of governmental power.4 Mr. Justice Holmes'
distinction between the state acting in a governmental capacity and
the state acting in a proprietary capacity has been substantially aban-
s See note 1 supra.
4Green v. Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Commonwealth v.
Brown, 270 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1967), af'd, 392 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 391 U.S. 921 (1968) ; Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 203
F. Supp. 855 (E.D. La. 1962), vacated in part, 212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. La. 1962).
Compare University of Miami v. Militana, 184 So. 2d 701 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla.
1966), with Parsons College v. North Cent. Ass'n, 271 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
See also Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (Pri-
vately operated restaurant under arm's-length lease with public parking authority
subject to equal protection clause. "Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances
can the non-obvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true
significance."); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 401 (1950)
("When authority derives in part from Government's thumb on the scales, the exer-
cise of that power by private persons becomes closely akin, in some respects, to its
exercise by Government itself."); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505 (1946)
(Privately owned company town subject to fourteenth amendment. "We do not agree
that the corporation's property interests settle the question .... The more an owner,
for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more
do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those
who use it."); Eaton v. Grubb, 329 F.2d 710 '(4th Cir. 1964) (private hospital
receiving federal aid and performing "public function" subject to fourteenth amend-
ment). See generally A. MILLER, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND PRIVATE EDUCATION
(1957); Dorsen, Racial Discrimination in "Private" Schools, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV.
39 (1967) ; Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REV. 3, 28-36 (1961) ;
Note, Private Government on the Campus -judicial Review of University Expul-
sions, 72 YALE L.J. 1362 (1963).
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doned.' Under either of these models - the university as an academic
institution and the university as an instrumentality of government
subject to constitutional restrictions on behalf of personal liberty -
the 100 percent on-campus/off-campus description of university
jurisdiction will not stand up.
Specific illustrations of constitutional control of the publicly
supported college as landholder, trustee, or contractual promisee
are readily available. A private property holder need not grant per-
mission that his land or buildings be available to students or to
anyone else as a place to hold meetings for discussing public issues,
hearing guest speakers, or assembling to express some grievance
(least of all against the property holder himself), whether or not
such assemblies were orderly, whether or not such meetings did
not conflict with anything else the property holder intended to do
at the time, and whether or not the property holder sometimes al-
lowed such meetings to be held on his property by people whose
ideas or backgrounds he happened to favor. If he elected to lease
the property to a group of persons, moreover, he could readily evict
them in the event they breached a covenant not to hold such meet-
ings.
If the property holder is placed in a position of power through
an exercise of rublic largess (as through the expenditure of tax rev-
enue in the operation of a college or university), however, his au-
thority is hedged by constitutional restraints which protect "the
freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peace-
ably to assemble and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances," and which forbid him to deny equal protection of such
5 See, e.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); Lamont v. Postmaster General,
381 U.S. 301 (1965); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) ; Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) ("It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of
religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions
upon a benefit or privilege.") ; Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) ; Frost
& Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926) ("It would
be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state legislation which, by words
of express divestment, seeks to strip the citizen of rights guaranteed by the federal
Constitution, but to uphold an act by which the same result is accomplished under
the guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for a valuable privilege which the
state threatens otherwise to withhold . . . . It is inconceivable that guarantees embed-
ded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be manipulated out of exist-
ence.") ; Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961). For
discussions of this subject see Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional
Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 321 (1935); Linde, Constitutional Rights in the Public
Sector: Justice Douglas on Liberty in the Welfare State, 40 WASH. L. REV. 10
(1965); O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings
Attached, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 443 (1966); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J.
733 (1964) ; Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Consti-
tutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1595 (1960).
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rights.' Accordingly, on-campus bans against guest speakers have
been enjoined where the rule supporting the ban was so vague as
to reserve carte blanche censorship to the administration' and where
the university classified speakers as acceptable or unacceptable in
terms of their political affiliations,8 their unrelated conduct before
congressional committees,' or their having been subject to an un-
adjudicated criminal charge - even one of murder or homosexual
soliciting.1" Where no physical disorder is imminent, where there
is no substantial basis for supposing that the speaker will himself
violate the law or incite others to a violation in the course of his
remarks, where the facilities are otherwise available and other
guest speakers are generally allowed on campus, the student residents
interested in hearing a given speaker on campus may not be
denied. Moreover, peaceful political expression or orderly and
nondisruptive assemblies on campus by students meeting to express
some felt grievance against the college itself is a protected form
6 See authorities cited notes 4, 5 supra. Once it is clear that the property owner's
operation is sufficiently pervaded with governmental presence as to make the Consti-
tution apply, it is appropriate to suggest that one can no more rely on the right-
privilege distinction than can the government itself.
"Dickson v. Sitterson, 280 F. Supp. 486 (M.D.N.C. 1968) ("known member of the
Communist Party," "known to advocate the overthrow of government" held void for
vagueness). The current speaker regulation in force at the University of Mississippi is
probably vulnerable on the same basis, (see Note, Mississippi's Campus Speaker Ban:
Constitutional Considerations and the Academic Freedom of Students, 38 Miss. L.J.
488 (1967)), as is the Louisiana statute (see 42 TUL. L. REV. 394 (1968)). An anti-
demonstration rule in South Carolina was also recently held void for vagueness, prior
restraint, and inadequate standards, in Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272
F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967). It is clear that special first amendment concerns require
a degree of clarity, precision, standards, and specificity in this area considerably in
excess of what may be demanded of other types of rules as a matter of due process.
See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (and cases cited
therein) ; Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 (1966). For other discussions of consti-
tutional limitations on speaker control see Pollitt, Campus Censorship: Statute Bar-
ring Speakers from State Educational Institutions, 42 N.C.L. REv. 179 (1963) ; Van
Alstyne, Political Speakers at State Universities: Some Constitutional Considerations,
111 U. PA. L. REV. 328 (1963).
8 Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946);
Buckley v. Meng, 35 Misc. 2d 467, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sup. Ct. 1962). See also
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) ; DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353
(1937).
9 Dickson v. Sitterson, 280 F. Supp. 486 (M.D.N.C. 1968) (special regulation of any
speaker having utilized his privilege against self-incrimination before a state or federal
investigating committee, held invalid as an unconstitutional condition upon the use
of the privilege).
10 Student Liberal Fed'n v. Louisiana State Univ., Civil No. 68-300 (E.D. La., Feb. 13,
1968) ; Stacy v. Williams, Civil No. WC 6725 (N.D. Miss., June 30, 1967) (involv-
ing a temporary restraining order to enable the speaker to appear, but evidently on
the basis that his contract antedated the speaker's rule rather than on a free speech
or equal protection basis).
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of expression.11 Nor may the college mute criticism of itself by
forbidding critical student comment in the campus newspaper. 2
In all of these respects, university government is subject to a sub-
stantial degree of constraint similar to that which limits the civil
government from which the university derives its powers. As a
campus constituent of that university government, the student does
not forfeit his freedom of speech and cannot be made to barter it
away as a condition of being admitted or of remaining.1"
Additional illustrations might be provided to make the point
that a student cannot be made to leave his rights as a citizen outside
the college's doors. Virtually all colleges today provide at least some
on-campus lodgings for students. Unlike the situation respecting the
private landlord who may contractually reserve a right to enter and
inspect the premises at any time and for reasons satisfactory only
to himself, however, it is exceedingly likely that the fourth amend-
ment's interdiction of "unreasonable searches and seizures" restricts
colleges receiving substantial public support from imposing such
sweeping conditions upon a student's privacy as those which may
be reserved by contract to a private landlord. Random fishing expe-
ditions without warrant and without an excusable emergency, result-
ing in the seizure of things subsequently introduced in a disciplinary
hearing to provide a basis for expelling the student, are probably
11 Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967). See
Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966) (classroom wearing of 'Freedom"
buttons protected by first amendment). See also Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131
(1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372
U.S. 229 (1963); West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943);
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir.
1967), cert. granted, 390 U.S. 942 (1968).
But distractingly raucous demonstrations or other modes of expression which
directly disrupt or obstruct authorized activities on campus may appropriately be
punished. Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966) ;
Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 288 (S.D.W. Va. 1968); Zanders v. Louisiana
State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968) ; Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F.
Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968); Jones v. Board of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn.
1968) ; Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463
(1967) ; in re Bacon, 240 Cal. App. 2d 34, 49 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1966). And certain
facilities may probably be closed altogether to demonstrations, without regard to
whether the demonstration would have been orderly. See Cameron v. Johnson, 390
U.S. 611 (1968) ; Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) ; Cox v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 559 (1965).
1See Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967), final
decision postponed on appeal, 394 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1968). See also Pickering v.
Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968), holding that a teacher may not be fired
because of partially false statements critical of the trustees which appeared in a letter
to the editor published in a regular newspaper and which concerned an issue of gen-
eral public interest.
13 See authorities cited note 5 supra. See also West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943) ; Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613, 618
(M.D. Ala. 1967) ("A state cannot force a college student to forfeit his constitu-
tionally protected right of freedom of expression as a condition to his attending a
state-supported institution.").
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forbidden.14 The fact that the premises, and perhaps the very rooms
themselves, may be owned by the state does not displace the fourth
amendment or eliminate a student-citizen's right to due process
respecting the manner in which evidence used against him has been
seized. The fourteenth amendment makes no broad distinction be-
tween "governmental" and "proprietary" state action, and a state
university must continue to observe standards of constitutional fair-
ness even when acting as a proprietor.' 5 Indeed, in the broader
context of social trends, it should shock us to suppose that the right
of privacy might not extend to governmentally owned or operated
residences. Given the trend in housing generally, with an ever
larger fraction of living places either owned by government (as in
public housing) or underwritten by government (as through VA,
FHA, and FNMA), any view which would limit the constitutional
right of privacy to privately owned dwellings would effectively
shrink the right itself, removing it from an ever larger percentage
of the whole population, and seriously subordinating them to the
risks so explicit in George Orwell's 1984. Because of the trend toward
developing ever more on-campus living units for students, we should
be even more concerned as academicians not to act in ways which
unintentionally teach our students that we ourselves are the intruding
Big Brother.
Finally, norms of constitutional law have been applied with
increasing frequency to the procedure, even more than to the sub-
stance, of college discipline. Because this subject has been more
thoroughly explored elsewhere than any other subject, 6 I shall
consider it only briefly - but well enough to reiterate the essential
point respecting the inadequacy of contractual and property analo-
gies.
In ordering the reinstatement of university students dismissed
14 People v. Overton, 51 Misc. 2d 140, 273 N.Y.S.2d 143 (1966) (fourth amendment's
ban against unreasonable search extends to student's school locker, and vice principal
may not grant consent to police search) ; Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy
State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968) (fourth amendment applied to stu-
dent's on-campus room, search upheld on "reasonable" cause, dicta imply that fishing
expedition search would taint evidence seized pursuant thereto). See also Camara v.
Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (housing code regulation providing for warrant-
less administrative searches struck down) ; Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 66 Cal. 2d
260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1967) (welfare payments cannot be condi-
tioned on consent to submit to warrantless searches). See generally Note, The Fourth
Amendment and Housing Inspections, 77 YALE L.J. 521 (1968).
15 See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439, 1458-64 (1968).
16 The following text on procedural due process is substantially reproduced from my own
article, Van Alstyne, The Judicial Trend Toward Student Academic Freedom, 20 U.
FLA. L. REv. 290 (1968), where references to other writings on the same subject are
provided. (See also Selected Bibliography on Student Rights, appendix to this article.)
I regret the duplication, but could scarcely see any way of avoiding it.
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without hearing for alleged participation in off-campus demon-
strations, a federal court of appeals observed in 1961:
The precise nature of the private interest involved in this case
is the right to remain at a public institution of higher learning in
which the plaintiffs were students in good standing. It requires no
argument to demonstrate that education is vital and, indeed, basic
to civilized society. Without sufficient education the plaintiffs
would not be able to earn an adequate livelihood, to enjoy life to
the fullest, or to fulfill as completely as possible the duties and
responsibilities of good citizens. 17
In view of the importance of the students' interest which was
placed in jeopardy by the threat to dismiss them, the court required
that such action must not be taken without the institutional observ-
ance of certain minimal procedural safeguards which would lessen
the likelihood of errors and prejudice. Subsequent cases have made
clear that the degree of quasi-judicial formality in college disciplinary
proceedings need only be proportioned to the gravity of the offense,
and that no college need fear that every alleged infraction, no mat-
ter how minor the penalty, must be determined in a cumbersome
and divisive adversary proceeding. 8 When the consequences at-
tached to the alleged misconduct are very serious to the student's
future, however, an increasing number of procedural requirements
must correspondingly be observed. In the gravest cases (e.g., those
involving expulsion, long-term suspension, widely available recorda-
tion of offenses carrying a high degree of popular stigma), the col-
lege must probably proceed with at least as much care as is now
required of a juvenile court - especially as so many of its students
are not juveniles and not at all subject to the fading rationale of
in loco parentis.
The proposition that even minors cannot be disciplined in a
manner affecting substantial interests without the observance of pro-
cedural due process was specifically affirmed by the Supreme Court
only last year. In prospectively requiring juvenile courts to improve
the judicial nature of their proceedings, the Court declared:
Failure to observe the fundamental requirements of due process
has resulted in instances, which might have been avoided, of unfair-
ness to individuals and inadequate or inaccurate findings of fact and
unfortunate prescriptions of remedy. Due process of law is the pri-
mary and indispensable foundation of individual freedom. It is the
basic and essential term in the social compact which defines the
17Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 930 (1961). See also Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D.
Tenn. 1961).
18 Compare Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961),
with Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959). See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1959); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm.
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
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rights of the individual and delimits the powers which the state
may exercise.
In view of this, it would be extraordinary if our Constitution
did not require the procedural regularity and the exercise of care
implied in the phrase "due process." Under our Constitution, the
condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court.19
The jettisoning of in loco parentis was, it may be suggested,
long overdue in any case. For one thing, the mean age of American
college students is more than 21 years, and there are, in fact, more
students over the age of 30 than younger than the age of 18.20 Even
in Blackstone's time, the doctrine did not apply to persons over 21.21
For another thing, it is unrealistic to assume that relatively imperson-
al and large-scale institutions can act in each case with the same
degree of solicitous concern as a parent reflects in the intimacy of
his own home. The parent is doubtless restrained in tempering dis-
cipline with love and concern which one expects of a father or
mother, while the institution cannot hope to reflect the same in-
tense degree of emotional identification with those in attendance,
no matter how well it may intend to do so. The institution is also
subject to different practical concerns - to keep its eye on reaction
by the local press, disgruntlement among alumni, dissatisfaction
among benefactors, and others whose practical influence combine
to bring about an administrative perspective less loving and more
divided than a mother has for her own son or daughter. It simply
blinks at reality to treat the mother and the college as one and the
same in drawing legal analogies, no matter how frequently one refers
to his alma mater for other purposes. Finally, there is this to be
said: a parent's disciplinary authority does not extend to the power
literally to expel a dependent minor from his own home, but to
lesser penalties only. Yet, the typical sanction imposed by the al-
leged surrogate parent, a college, is the sanction of expulsion itself
- with all of the serious consequences to the student's future al-
ready noted above. As the analogy of in loco parentis is in many
ways false in fact, we need not be surprised nor alarmed that it is
now being discarded." Large-scale collegiate operations, the hetero-
19In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 19-20, 27-28 (1967).
20U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS, SERIES P-20, No. 110, POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS 12 (1961).
21 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *453.
22 See, e.g., Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280, 286 (D. Colo. 1968) ("We agree with
the students that the doctrine of 'In Loco Parentis' is no longer tenable in a university
community."); Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 463, 469 (1967) ("For constitutional purposes, the better approach, as indi-
cated in Dixon, recognizes that state universities should no longer stand in loco
parentis in relation to their students.").
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geneity of their student bodies, the varying ages of their students,
the irreducible impersonality of their operation, and the grave con-
sequences of their disciplinary proceedings, all support the height-
ened requirements of greater procedural fairplay in their treatment
of alleged violators of their rules. The immediate, practical, and
constitutional result of these phenomena is this: colleges and uni-
versities may no longer enforce their rules through sanctions seri-
ously jeopardizing a student's career in the absence of procedures
which are fundamentally fair. The essential elements of fair pro-
cedure include (but may not be limited to) the following require-
ments:
(1) Serious disciplinary action may not be taken in the absence
of published rules which:
(a) are not "so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its appli-
cation" ;23 and
23Dickson v. Sitterson, 280 F. Supp. 486, 498 (M.D.N.C. 1968). See also Hammond
v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967); Buckley v. Meng,
35 Misc. 2d 467, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sup. Ct. 1962) ; Soglin v. Kauffman, Opinion
and Order No. 67-C-141 (W.D. Wis., Dec. 11, 1967) (General "misconduct" rule
as applied to demonstrations acknowledged to raise grave first amendment question,
although temporary restraining order withheld pending fuller hearing. "The consti-
tutional requirement of reasonable specificity and narrowness in rule-making in the
First Amendment area has not as yet been suspended in non-university society.").
At the same time, a number of recent federal decisions have not demanded even
ordinary clarity in rules, and some have upheld student suspensions based merely on
a wholly undefined "inherent power." See, e.g., Dunmar v. Ailes, 348 F.2d 51
(D.C. Cir. 1965); Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.W. Va. 1968);
Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968) ; Buttny
v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968) ; Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 279 F.
Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968); Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal.
App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967); Morris v. Nowotny, 323 S.W.2d 301
(Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
Despite the opinions in these cases, I cannot believe that they are soundly
reasoned. They are, as Professor William Cohen suggested, highly reminiscent of
A. P. Herbert's hearty spoof in Rex v. Haddock, in which the accused had jumped
into the Thames purely for fun, and in which the Court of Criminal Appeal affirmed
his conviction in spite of the fact that no one could find any statute which he had
violated. The court stated:
Citizens who take it upon themselves to do unusual actions which attract the
attention of the police should be careful to bring these actions into one of
the recognized categories of crimes and offences, for it is intolerable that
the police should be put to the pains of inventing reasons for finding them
undesirable .... It is not for me to say what offence the appellant has com-
mitted, but I am satisfied that he has committed some offence, for which he
has been most properly punished.
A. HERBERT, MISLEADING CASES IN THE COMMON LAW 31, 33, 36-37 (4th ed.
1928). (The concurring judge "said that in his opinion, the appellant had done his
trousers no good and the offence was damage to property.")
More seriously, vagueness and ambulatory administrative discretion as well as
lack of notice of rules are constitutionally vicious, even aside from whether or not
an individual had reason to suppose that he might subsequently be punished for his
proposed conduct. The general problem is very well reviewed in Amsterdam, The
Void jor Vagueness Doctrine, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960) ; Collings, Unconstitl-
lional Uncertainty-An Appraisal, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 195 (1955).
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(b) do not depend upon the unqualified discretion of a
particular administrator for their application.24
(2) Where the rules are reasonably clear and their application
does not depend upon uncontrolled discretion, a student still may
not be seriously disciplined (as by suspension) unless:
(a) the student charged with an infraction has been fur-
nished with a written statement of the charge adequately in
advance of a hearing to enable him to prepare (e.g., 10 days) ;25
(b) the student thus charged "shall be permitted to inspect
in advance of such hearing any affidavits or exhibits which the
college intends to submit at the hearing";26
(c) the student is "permitted to have counsel present at
the hearing to advise [him]" ;27
(d) the student is "permitted to hear the evidence pre-
sented against [him]," or at least the student should be given
24 Applied in Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C.
1967). See also cases cited note 23 supra.
As a practical guide, colleges should be most clear and confined, and provide
for the least general administrative discretion with respect to rules applied to first
amendment interests (i.e., speech, assembly, petitioning, or association). Vague,
overly broad, or standardless rules in this area are regarded as unconstitutional per se
due to their chilling effect on these preferred freedoms. See, e.g., Zwickler v. Koota,
389 U.S. 241 (1967) ; Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603-04, 608-10
(1966); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 378 U.S. 127 (1964); Dickson v. Sitterson, 280 F.
Supp. 486 (M.D.N.C. 1968). Specificity and notice of the rules may also be demanded
under circumstances where the rule requires those subject to it to take some affirma-
tive act, or to avoid conduct which they might reasonably suppose not to be wrong-
ful. See, e.g., Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225'(1957). That is, the more peculiar
the rule in terms of the ordinary expectations of those bound by it, the more neces-
sary are clarity and notice. For the rest, greater flexibility is doubtless constitutionally
permissible. Compare Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939), and Connally v.
General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926), with Nash v. United States, 229
U.S. 373 (1913), and United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1946). A recent attempt
to provide a reasonably clear list of basic regulations at the University of California
is described in 17 AMER. COUNCIL ON EDUC. BULL. No. 8 (1968).
2 Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967) ; Schiff v.
Hannah, 282 F. Supp. 381 (W.D. Mich. 1966) (en banc); Woody v. Bums, 188 So.
2d 56 (Fla. Ct. App. 1960). But see Jones v. Board of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190
(M.D. Tenn. 1968) '(upholding expulsions based on two days notice); Due v.
Florida A. & M. Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963) (required only that
charges be read to students at the beginning of the disciplinary hearing).
2Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 651 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
27 Id. See also Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725
(M.D. Ala. 1968); Goldwyn v. Allen, 281 N.Y.S.2d 899 (Sup. Ct. 1967) ; Madera v.
Board of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), rev'd, 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir.
1967) (on grounds that the hearing was not essentially disciplinary or penal, but more
in the nature of counselling to determine the appropriate school in which petitioner
should be located), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968). But see Wasson v. Trow-
bridge, 382 F.2d 807 (1967) (Merchant Marine Academy); Dunmars v. Ailes, 348
F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (military academy); Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp.
228 (S.D.W. Va. 1968) (suspension upheld, notwithstanding refusal to permit
students to be represented by counsel). See Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D.
Colo. 1968) (counsel permitted); Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190
(M.D. Tenn. 1968) (counsel permitted) ; Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248
Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967) (counsel permitted-entire hearing
procedure unusually comprehensive).
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the names of the witnesses against him and an oral or written
report on the facts to which each witness testifies ;
(e) the student or his attorney may question at the hearing
any witness who gives evidence against him;29
(f) those who hear the case "shall determine the facts of
each case solely on the evidence presented at the hearing" ;3 10
(g) "the results and findings of the hearing should be
presented in a report open to the student's inspection";"
(h) "either side may, at its own expense, make a record
of the events at the hearing."3 2
2Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 651 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
See Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 930 (1961); Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn.
1961). See also Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp.
725 (M.D. Ala. 1968); Schiff v. Hannah, 282 F. Supp. 381 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
2Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cr.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 930 (1961) indicated that cross-examination may not be required: "This is not
to imply that a full dress hearing, with the right to cross-examine witnesses, is
required." Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967)
held that a student, but not his counsel, has the right to cross-examine. Yet, in most
recent cases, disciplinary boards permitted cross-examination by student or counsel.
See, e.g., Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725
(M.D. Ala. 1968); Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747
(W.D. La. 1968); Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968); Jones v.
Board of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968); Dickey v. Alabama State Bd.
of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967); Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.,
248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1967). There appears to be little reason
to forbid so customary a function of counsel, reserving to the hearing board substan-
tial discretion to limit counsel's participation to avoid unreasonable delay, harassment,
or simple grandstanding. None of the cases suggest that formal rules of evidence
need be observed nor is any such requirement suggested by customary practice in
adjudicative administrative hearings.
30 Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 652 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
But see Jones v. Board of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190, 200 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), which
heavily qualifies this view and, notwithstanding its cautionary language, accepts what
is both a questionable and unnecessary practice. "There is no violation of procedural
due process when a member of a disciplinary body at a university sits on a case after
he has shared with other members information concerning the facts of a particular
incident.... This limited combination by a school administrative body of prosecutorial
and adjudicatory functions is not fundamentally unfair in the absence of a showing
of other circumstances, such as malice or personal interest in the outcome of a case."
It would appear that there may implicitly exist a "personal interest" in the outcome
under such circumstances, as well as an unfair disadvantage to the student in not
knowing what alleged information may thus be privately circulated within the hearing
board.
31 Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 930 (1961); Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649
(W.D. Mo. 1967); Woody v. Burns, 188 So. 2d 56 (Fla. Ct. App. 1960).
32 Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649, 652 (W.D. Mo. 1967). The
better practice in terms of fairness and economy, at many institutions, is to have a
simple tape recording of the entire proceedings from which a typed transcript can be
prepared if necessary. In addition to the cases previously cited, for illustrations of the
varying degree of procedural due process required by other courts see Woods v.
Wright, 334 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1964), and the marginal due process held to be
sufficient in Wright v. Texas Southern Univ., 277 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. Tex. 1967),
ajI'd, 392 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1968) ; Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir.
1967); Due v. Florida A. & M. Univ., 233 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Fla. 1963). Essen-
tially no procedural due process was required in Greene v. Howard Univ., 271 F.
Supp. 609 (D.D.C. 1967), on the theory that the university was private and not sub-
ject to the fifth or fourteenth amendments. The case is almost surely in error; even
before hearing an appeal on the merits, the court of appeals ordered temporary
reinstatement of the students. Civil No. 1949-67 (D.C. Cir., Sept. 8, 1967).
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These procedural safeguards roughly parallel some of the
standards required by criminal courts in their disposition of offenses
punishable by fine or short term imprisonment. The comparison is
not fortuitous because it is now evident that expulsion or exclusion
from college may, in the long run, disadvantage an individual at
least as much as a single infraction of a criminal statute. There
should be no surprise, therefore, that students are entitled at least
to a similar degree of due process as a suspected pickpocket. Indeed,
the requisites of due process still evolving from federal decisions
are substantially less than standards already recommended by pro-
fessional educational associations. The Association of American
Colleges (representing administrations of nearly 900 colleges), the
American Association of University Professors (representing about
86,000 full-time faculty at accredited institutions), the National
Student Association, the National Association of Student Personnel
Administrators, the National Association of Women Deans and
Counsellors, and the American Association of Higher Education
have recently approved a Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms
of Students which goes considerably beyond the requirements sug-
gested in court decisions. In respect to procedural due process, the
joint Statement provides:
B. Investigation of Student Conduct
1. Except under extreme emergency circumstances, premises
occupied by students and the personal possessions of students should
not be searched unless appropriate authorization has been obtained.
For premises such as residence halls controlled by the institution,
an appropriate and responsible authority should be designated to
whom application should be made before a search is conducted. The
application should specify the reasons for the search and the objects
or information sought. The student should be present, if possible,
during the search. For premises not controlled by the institution,
the ordinary requirements for lawful search should be followed.
2. Students detected or arrested in the course of serious viola-
tions of institutional regulations, or infractions of ordinary law,
should be informed of their rights. No form of harassment should
be used by institutional representatives to coerce admissions of guilt
or information about conduct of other suspected persons.
C. Status of Student Pending Final Action
Pending action on the charges, the status of a student should
not be altered, or his right to be present on the campus and to attend
classes suspended, except for reasons relating to his physical or
emotional safety and well-being, or for reasons relating to the safety
and well-being of students, faculty, or university property.
D. Hearing Committee Procedures
When the misconduct may result in serious penalties and if the
student questions the fairness of disciplinary action taken against
him, he should be granted, on request, the privilege of a hearing
before a regularly constituted hearing committee. The following
suggested hearing committee procedures satisfy the requirements
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of procedural due process in situations requiring a high degree of
formality:
1. The hearing committee should include faculty members or
students, or, if regularly included or requested by the accused, both
faculty and student members. No member of the hearing committee
who is otherwise interested in the particular case should sit in judg-
ment during the proceeding.
2. The student should be informed, in writing, of the reasons
for the proposed disciplinary action with sufficient particularity, and
in sufficient time, to insure opportunity to prepare for the hearing.
3. The student appearing before the hearing committee should
have the right to be assisted in his defense by an adviser of his
choice.
4. The burden of proof should rest upon the officials bring-
ing the charge.
5. The student should be given an opportunity to testify and
to present evidence and witnesses. He should have an opportunity
to hear and question adverse witnesses. In no case should the com-
mittee consider statements against him unless he has been advised
of their content and of the names of those who made them, and
unless he has been given an opportunity to rebut unfavorable infer-
ences which might otherwise be drawn.
6. All matters upon which the decision may be based must be
introduced into evidence at the proceeding before the hearing com-
mittee. The decision should be based solely upon such matters.
Improperly acquired evidence should not be admitted.
7. In the absence of a transcript, there should be both a digest
and a verbatim record, such as a tape recording, of the hearing.
8. The decision of the hearing committee should be final,
subject only to the student's right of appeal to the President or
ultimately to the governing board of the institution.3a
The late (and judicially conservative) Mr. Justice Frankfurter
once observed that "the history of liberty has largely been the history
of observance of procedural safeguards." 4 So it is with students, as
with others.
Somewhat anticlimactically, however, it is necessary to note a
few additional matters in rendering our treatment of student pro-
cedural due process with complete accuracy:
(1) The federal cases involving procedural due process for
students have been disposed of by courts below the level of the
United States Supreme Court, and thus their utterances on this subject
are not necessarily the last word. Indeed, a number of federal courts
disagree among themselves respecting the requisite degree of college
due process.35
33 Joint Statement on Rights and Freedoms of Students, 53 A.A.U.P. BULL. 365,
368 (1967). See also A.C.L.U., ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OF STU-
DENTS IN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES (rev. ed. 1965) (This is an earlier ACLU
statement to which the Joint Statement is indebted.). Comprehensive reports on student
rights and freedoms have also recently been completed at the University of California,
Michigan State University, Cornell University, Brown University, University of Wis-
consin, and Swarthmore College.
3 4 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943). See also Frankfurter's para-
phrasing of the same point in Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945).
35 See notes 25-32 supra.
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(2) On the other hand, it is reasonable to expect that additional
safeguards may be posed by the courts if it appears that complete
fairness is still not being observed. For instance, it is foreseeable
that random and unannounced searching of student rooms may be
forbidden, that students may not be coerced into admissions of mis-
deeds, and that some greater degree of cross-sectional representation
on hearing boards may eventually be required."6
(3) A clear distinction will probably continue to be made, how-
ever, respecting campus offenses carrying such relatively insubstantial
penalties (e.g., social probation, minor fines, loss of auto privileges)
that formal due process is not demanded and may well be dispensed
with in the interest of administrative convenience.
(4) A distinction will probably continue to be made as well in
instances where students face the prospect of being dropped due to
inadequate grades. It is true, of course, that dismissal for academic
deficiency may be as serious to the student's educational career as
dismissal for disciplinary reasons, but quasi-judicial procedures are
generally inadequate as a means of determining whether, for in-
stance, an essay examination should have been graded as a C rather
than a D. A lay panel may ordinarily lack the competence of second-
guessing grades. Only where the student's complaint alleges egregious
and almost willfully biased grading may the college be required to
provide some means of review, and even then the review would
presumably involve a panel of professors familiar with the subject
matter of the examination and who would follow a different pro-
cedure than in a disciplinary case.37
(5) Finally, disciplinary proceedings are different from counsel-
ling proceedings where the student does not stand in jeopardy of a
penalty. So long as the counsellor is required to respect the confi-
dentiality of his relationship and acts without power to impose
punishment, no reason exists to import an adversary or quasi-judicial
procedure which would undermine the counsellor's essential func-
tions.38
The ultimate legality of a college rule, then, clearly cannot be
measured merely by the geography within which it has to operate.
And it is well that this is so, for it also means, of course, that rules
which are otherwise reasonable do not become unreasonable merely
because they may sometimes circumscribe conduct which occurs out-
side the campus itself. A rule appropriately forbidding plagiarism,
for instance, obviously does not become inappropriate as applied to
36 On the particular point of random searches see text accompanying note 14 supra.
37 See, e.g., Connelly v. University of Vt., 244 F. Supp. 156 (D. Vt. 1965). Compare
Woody v. Burns, 188 So. 2d 56 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966).
3See, e.g., Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967) ; Cosme v. Board
of Educ., 50 Misc. 2d 344, 270 N.Y.S.2d 231 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
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a student who copies his paper from a reference work in his own
home away from campus. A rule restricting student organizations
from representing that their demonstrations carry the endorsement
of the college itself does not become invalid when applied to a
demonstration held downtown; indeed, the more off campus the
location where such a representation might be made, the more legiti-
mate the rule, due to the greater necessity that the institution shall
not needlessly suffer from some public misunderstanding. The
constitutional emphasis, then, turns not upon distinctions between
students as "citizens" and students as "residents"; it turns, rather,
upon the larger reasonableness of each rule, and the parameters of
'reasonableness" are several, not singular.
II. DUAL RESIDENCY AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Despite what I have said earlier in this article, for certain sig-
nificant purposes a student does reside in several communities at
once and is made answerable for his conduct to the law of each
community in turn. His dormitory may have rules affecting his
conduct as a dormitory resident, his college has overlapping rules
which affect him as a resident of the college, the city laws may
overlap both college regulations and dormitory rules, and so on
right on through some federal statutes. A single act of misconduct
may accordingly subject a student to a multiplicity of trials and
punishments, exactly to the extent that the laws of these several
jurisdictions happen to overlap. Thus, a student who rifles the
drawer of a roommate and steals a postal money order may:
(1) be tried by a dormitory council, and if found guilty of vio-
lating a rule forbidding theft in the dormitory, he may then be
fined or expelled from the dormitory as otherwise provided by the
dormitory rule;
(2) be tried by the college judicial board, and if found guilty
of violating a rule forbidding theft, he may then be fined, suspended,
expelled, or otherwise disciplined as provided in the college rules;
(3) be tried in the municipal court for theft, and if convicted he
may then be fined or jailed (or both) pursuant to local ordinance;
(4) be tried in the superior court for theft, and if convicted he
may then be fined or jailed (or both) pursuant to state statute;
(5) be tried in federal court for theft, and if convicted he may
then be fined or jailed (or both) pursuant to federal statutes appli-
cable to postal money orders.
We accept this scheme of multiple trials and multiple punish-
ments for a single offense in spite of the constitutional provision
that no person shall "be twice put in jeopardy... for the
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same offense." Our understanding is, rather, that there were five
different offenses in this one event and the student was tried and
punished only once for each offense, even allowing that he per-
formed but a single act and endured an accumulation of five trials
and five punishments.39 Since each community has a separate legis-
lative capacity of its own over its own territory, the aggregation of
trials and punishments results without constitutional objection be-
cause the student was, while living in one place, a resident of five
communities with each overlapping all the lesser ones within it.
Yet, as we look again at this situation, some parts of the ar-
rangement may lead us to conclude that we have sacrificed the
substance of the double jeopardy clause to the mere form of manipul-
able laws. As between the municipal and state prosecutions for theft
under identically worded laws (except that the municipal law ap-
plies only to theft committed within the town whereas the state
law applies whether or not the theft was committed within a town),
for instance, why do we permit more than one trial to be held?
(Note, of course, that the defendant might first have been acquitted
in the state trial and then convicted in the municipal trial or vice
versa.) What purpose is served, assuming the defendant is convicted
in each trial, by allowing multiple sentences to be imposed and even
consecutively (rather than concurrently) served? Should we have had
even another trial and another prison sentence consecutively added,
had the county board of supervisors also adopted a countywide theft
ordinance?
We recoil from such an endless proliferation of cruel and point-
less trials and punishments, I think, instinctively recognizing an
essential unfairness to any person haplessly packed from court to
court.4" We would tend to say, rather, that more than a single trial
and punishment ought not befall a man for a single act unless:
(1) there are clear and distinct interests peculiar to each com-
39 Overlapping and consecutive state and federal prosecutions have been upheld by the
Supreme Court. See, e.g., Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959) ; Bartkus v.
Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) ; United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922). Over-
lapping and consecutive state and municipal prosecutions have also been upheld by
a number of state supreme and inferior federal courts. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel.
Ladd v. Middlebrooks, 270 F. Supp. 295 (E.D. La. 1967) ; State v. Tucker, 137
Wash. 162, 242 P. 363 (1926).
40The problem of multiple state and substate prosecutions for a single act is compre-
hensively reviewed and smartly challenged in Comment, Constitutional Law: Succes-
sive Municipal and State Prosecutions Found Permissible Despite Assumed Applica-
tion of Double Jeopardy Clause, 1968 DUKE L.J. 362. The footnotes to that Com-
ment collect so much of the professional writing and cases that further documentation
is dispensed with here. The author argues that consecutive state and local prosecutions
within a single state for a single act may violate the double jeopardy clause - a propo-
sition which arguably might extend to penalties imposed by state universities
assuming, however, that the proceeding is in fact quasi-criminal and seeks only to
vindicate public interests already wholly vindicated in some prior state or municipal
penal action.
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munity which seeks separately to impose its own jurisdiction over
the alleged offender; and
(2) these distinctive interests have not in fact been adequately
fulfilled in the trial and punishment process of any of the other
communities previously asserting jurisdiction over the alleged
offender.
In our postal money order theft, for instance, it is difficult to
see any distinctive interest held by the city which is not held equally
by the county, and any held by the county not held equally by the
state. It would seem better that a single prosecution be held under
either the ordinance or the state theft statute (but not under both),
therefore, and that the common interests of these three overlapping
communities in the safety of their residents and protection of their
property be composed in that one proceeding. Similarly, while the
federal government might originally have had in theory a distinctive
interest of its own in protecting postal services as a federal instru-
mentality, wholly apart from any concern for the safety of persons
or property in any given state, a fair trial has incidentally discharged
the function of the federal statute as well. An additional federal
prosecution would now seem purely cumulative and vindictive, vio-
lating the spirit if not the technical form of double jeopardy.4
So, indeed, it may be in the relation of parietal college rules
and state laws, especially where the college has a purely duplicative
rule that quite literally presumes to make an academic offense of
anything forbidden by any local, state, or federal law. Assuming
that a student drives too fast on the interstate highway, for instance,
the hazards for which he is responsible by his conduct are already
policed by the general speeding law he has violated; to the extent
that the college would discourage speedy driving for the very same
reasons, e.g., to protect the lives and safety of others, it has no
interests sufficiently different from those already reflected in the
general speeding law so to warrant its piling on a separate prosecu-
tion and punishment. Indeed, where the reckless driving occurred
away from campus, the college itself has no separate community
interest of its own any more than the town has a proper basis for
41 I think double prosecutions for the same offense are so contrary to the spirit
of our free country that they violate even the prevailing view of the Four-
teenth Amendment ....
... Looked at from the standpoint of the individual who is being prose-
cuted, this notion [of multiple sovereignty] is too subtle for me to grasp.
If double punishment is what is feared, it hurts no less for two "Sovereigns"
to inflict it than for one. If danger to the innocent is emphasized, that danger
is surely no less when the power of State and Federal Governments is
brought to bear on one man in two trials, than when one of these "Sover-
eigns" proceeds alone.
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 150-51, 155 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
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assuming criminal jurisdiction under municipal ordinances for reck-
less driving offenses occurring beyond municipal limits. Where the
reckless driving occurs within campus precincts, moreover, all appro-
priate college concerns may still be adequately fulfilled in the treat-
ment of the alleged offender in the course of his trial in the munici-
pal court. Thus, application of a college rule to offenses committed
on campus might appropriately await the determination of the
municipal court proceedings.
What I mean to propose by this suggestion is a serious, three-
step reevaluation of the very great number of college rules which
overlap local, state, and federal laws; rules, for instance, broadly
punishing vandalism, theft, assault, drug use, and alcohol abuse. The
first step requires a review of the college rules to determine whether
they are, in their subject matter and scope of application, justified
in terms of a clearly discernible college purpose not already com-
posed in other laws applicable to the conduct in question; or wheth-
er, to the contrary, the college rule merely duplicates what may cer-
tainly be appropriate police interests, but interests already covered
in general law. (In this connection, the locus of the offense may be
important. Vandalism of the college library, for instance, specifically
affecting college property, does a kind of damage distinct to the
college itself apart from the shared community concern to deter
criminal behavior.42 Vandalism of a downtown shop does not di-
rectly injure the college, and the wrongfulness of the act as an
offense to the community is readily punishable under existing local
or state law.)
The second step is to determine whether a college rule which
has an a priori basis to protect the college itself nonetheless ought
not be applied to a given infraction because an overlapping local
or state law has already been applied in such a fashion that the
functions of the college rule have been discharged in the regular,
off-campus proceeding. For instance, the student who allegedly
vandalized the college library may have been arrested, tried, and
acquitted or convicted and punished. If he were acquitted, the college
should surely think carefully about the wisdom of trying him again.
If he were convicted, the college should surely consider carefully
whether the punishment imposed was sufficient even in terms of
42 Arguably, however, the damage "distinct" to the college is civil rather than criminal,
since the criminal aspect is already fully reflected in the general criminal law which
makes vandalism a punishable offense. Thus, the college might appropriately confine
itself to seeking compensation in the same manner as anyone else, through a common
law tort action. Even when the criminal mischief is against the college's own property,
therefore, it is arguable that the college should not necessarily utilize its own quasi-
criminal processes to duplicate those already brought to bear by the municipal or
state court.
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the college's own interests- making it inappropriate to pursue the
matter further.4"
As to this second step, many colleges have operated in an
utterly different fashion; where college rules and state laws have
overlapped, a number of colleges have established working relations
with the downtown police so that the alleged offender is released
to the college and favored in this regard over nonstudents arrested
under identical circumstances. This, of course, is the seemingly
benevolent edge of in loco parentis, the college acting to favor its
students, shielding them from responsibilities unequally borne by
nonstudents less favored than they. (The benevolence may some-
times be only a "seeming" one, however, for the college, seeking
to maintain the goodwill of the police, may in fact then discipline
the student far more severely than would the court downtown - as
by expelling him and terminating his educational career, rather
than by imposing the fine or brief term in jail that he would have
received downtown.) These arrangements seem to be so doubtful,
both in terms of their legal correctness and in terms of their educa-
tional wisdom, however, that they should now be reconsidered. They
are legally doubtful to the extent that the police, by such arrange-
ments, unequally favor those who are fortunate enough to be stu-
dents. They are educationally doubtful, for some students may
acquire an "elitest" notion of themselves, placing themselves above
other citizens, while others may feel that they are made whipping
boys within the college in order that the college may preserve its
good standing with the town. On both accounts, the practice should
be seriously reviewed.
This does not mean that the college should take no interest
in its students involved with the courts; the fact that the student
may be far from home, in need of counsel, and practically disad-
vantaged in comparison with a local resident may of course make
it perfectly appropriate for the college to assist him in his difficulty
- short of buying off the police by promising suitably stringent
treatment of its own.
There is, however, a third step in this review. Some off-campus
offenses, not themselves more detrimental to the college than to
the larger community which polices them, may nonetheless raise
appropriate questions for independent review within the college-
questions respecting the continuing safety of the college itself. The
crime of selling narcotics is sometimes committed by persons who
are themselves addicted and who engage in proselytizing others to
4 Since a fine paid into court is neither measured by the damage done nor paid over to
the college, however, I do not mean to imply that the college ought not seek com-
pensation from the student on the same terms that it might seek compensation from
anyone else similarly doing damage. See note 42 supra.
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secure funds to meet their own needs as well as, in some cases, to
lessen their own feelings of guilt by providing themselves with
reassurance that others will also use narcotics. A person tried and
convicted in a regular court of law may, as a youthful first offender,
be given a suspended sentence and then be free to return at
once to college. Yet, the college may need to satisfy itself that the
young man's return to campus will not carry an unreasonable risk
to other students, and the college might therefore wish to make an
independent inquiry to determine the safety of allowing the student
to remain on campus. In short, since the municipal court's exercise
of judicial discretion in the treatment of a given offender need not
have given special attention to distinct college interests, the com-
mission by a student of certain types of crimes may make it appro-
priate that the college review the circumstances to determine whether
separate protective measures of its own would be warranted.
The shift in emphasis, however, is both real and important.
Colleges would no longer undertake to duplicate general law by
taking their own pound of flesh through expelling every student
convicted of a criminal offense, nor would they seek to under-
mine the accountability of their residents to regular law by providing
them an academic sanctuary for offenses committed in the larger
community. Rather, they would leave the policing of municipal
concerns to the municipal authorities, assisting their students only
to insure their fair and equal treatment in the regular courts, and
utilizing such information as they otherwise receive about criminal
law violations only to determine whether, in the nature of the
student's conduct and the delay or result reached in the regular
courts, there is some substantial need of the college requiring
separate action by the college to secure its own safety.
III. SOCIAL REGULATION OF DRESS AND DECORUM
An increasing number of campus controversies are now astir
which scholars may feel to be too foolish for serious consideration,
disputes where the complaint of the students seems trivial and the
concern of the college seems petty. Where the issue is thus one of
determining whether the triviality of the complaint outweighs the
pettiness of the rule, no one is likely to secure anything in which
he can take much pride. Yet, the controversy will not go away, and
even the examination of a small matter may yield principles capable
of more important uses. Thus, it may be worth our time briefly
to take stock of seemingly prankish students who increasingly
affront social regulations on campus by getting out of step: boys
with long hair, girls with short skirts, and other departures of
questioned taste. Cases have been litigated in state and federal courts
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where students, suspended until they conform, have fielded solemn
principles of the Constitution in defense of an inch or two more
of hair or an inch or two less of skirt. Some have tied their beards
to the first amendment, claiming that their hair length expresses a
point of view about society, that it constitutes hirsute advocacy of
more individuality, less conformity, and is, as such, a manifestation
of free speech as much protected from censorship as conventional
political discussion. Others anchor their claim in a larger freedom
of personality, a right to be let alone and to be as one wants to be,
free of regulation which serves no discernible important purpose
and reduces the individual to another conforming cardboard cutout
jigging up and down in a ticky-tacky college.44
Those issues litigated with respect to high school students have
generally been resolved against the students,45 although a few recent
successes4" in the courts are doubtless being watched somewhat
nervously with the understandable anxiety that there seems to be no
stopping point for the ubiquitous judiciary. Generally, they have
lost in court as a practical matter probably because the courts have
felt that student obstinacy on such slight matters was itself an un-
reasonable and pertinacious challenge to authority. A federal district
court, it might be said, surely has more important things to do than
consume its time in behalf of beatniks and mods. In defending these
cases, the colleges have likewise fielded high principles, including
the following:
(1) Social regulations are designed to contribute affirmatively
to the atmosphere of serious study and contemplation appropriate
to an institution of higher learning. Each institution is itself the
best judge of the environment most conducive to its educational
undertakings, and its expertise on the inappropriateness of certain
offensive practices surely ought not be second-guessed by judges
having little idea of a given campus situation.
(2) Were courts to intervene against the institution's own best
44 These and other arguments are enthusiastically developed in student writing: Com-
ment, A Student's Right to Govern His Personal Appearance, 17 J. PuB. L. 151
(1968) ; Comment, The Personal Appearance of Students - The Abuse of a Protected
Freedom, 20 ALA. L. REV. 104 (1967). See also 19 MERCER L. REV. 252 (1968);
37 U. COLO. L. REV. 492 (1965).
45 For cases upholding the school's position, even when there has been virtually no evi-
dence that the offending style in fact caused disruption to the educational routine see
Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 261 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Tex. 1966),
afi'd, 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968) ; Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La.
1967) ; Mitchell v. McCall, 273 Ala. 604, 143 So. 2d 629 (1962) ; Leonard v. School
Comm. of Attleboro, 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965).
46 The most important case involves reinstatement of a public school teacher transferred
out of the school because he continued to sport a well-trimmed beard in defi'nce of
the principal's ban. As the court noted, as an aside, the successful teacher wa- teach-
ing at John Muir High School which had been named after the well-bearded naturalist.
Finot v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 250 Cal. App. 2d 189, 58 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1967).
See also Zachry v. Brown, Civil No. 66-719 (N.D. Ala., June 30, 1967).
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judgment, moreover, the implied rebuke to the college would itself
undermine the degree of respect which teachers and administrators
must maintain if they are to function effectively on campus.
(3) Certain modes of dress, like certain modes of speech, are
forbidden simply because they detract from minimum good manners
which even a liberal college may surely expect as a part of its
academic life style. Sometimes it is even clear that a student assumes
some weird appearance simply to see how much he can get away
with. Under such circumstances, a failure to recognize what is gen-
uinely involved may undermine the institution and inadvertently
lead students to a destructive emulation of campus vagrants or
beatniks, impressing them with the audacity of persons who express
contempt for education and leading them into a similarly contemp-
tuous view of life. Just as the high school tough may mislead a
great number of other youngsters by humiliating a teacher with
a crude epithet or two, so can a college be undermined, it may be
feared, by the appearance as well as the actuality of free-wheeling
sex and vagrancy on campus.
As a lawyer, I expect that the courts generally will continue
to keep hands off in this area, even though the sanction a college
may employ to enforce its social regulations continues to be the
tough sanction of suspension until the student alters his offending
style. Though the penalty may seem to hurt a matter of great im-
portance to the student- his ability to complete his education -
the fact that it can be so easily avoided by yielding on so trivial a
matter as visiting a barber makes it difficult to foresee serious con-
stitutional injunctions issuing from the federal courts.
As an educator, however, I think we may badly misconstrue
the impact of rules which do not so much cultivate a high academic
life style as they frankly communicate to our students a degree of
peevishness, thin-skinned intolerance, and staid prejudice enforced
by supererogatory regulations. There is not only a generation gap,
but a far more disturbing educational gap; the teaching of John
Stuart Mill in the classroom but the preachments of Anthony Coin-
stock in our rules. Students are quick to note what we sometimes
prefer to deny even to ourselves, because its frank admission would
be so disturbing: it is more usually the case that restrictions such
as those on long hair for men and miniskirts on girls exist because
such styles are merely unsettling to us and not in the least dis-
ruptive to the school; they offend our taste, challenge our own
cultural conventions of manliness or, with the girls, lead to stray
thoughts of which we (or at least some of us) were taught to be
ashamed. Indeed, the adamant attitude of a college in pressing so
small a matter so very hard itself creates the confrontation which
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sponsors the only real commotion,47 which frequently martyrs the
nonconforming student and alienates others who are warranted in
resenting institutional police practices. Unless adventures in campus
caparisons reach such exaggerated proportions and unless material
evidence is forthcoming that freakish fashions are actually disrupting
classes or otherwise directly interfering with the academic program
(conditions I do not know to have obtained anywhere as yet), we
may indeed presume too far on the private lives of our students by
regimenting their tastes. The student may reside on campus, of
course, but when was it ever well argued that a community -much
less a free and scholarly one - could properly regiment the dress of
its residents?
IV. "CRIME AND PUNISHMENT"
"My object all sublime
I shall achieve in time
To make the punishment fit the crime
The punishment fit the crime."
- The Mikado
We have known for a long time that the sanctions employed
by our regular criminal law - usually fine or jail - are frequently
unimaginative and unduly inflexible. Yet, our general scheme of
sanctions in our colleges is less imaginative by far, as it traditionally
has tended indiscriminately to employ an academic death penalty
as the preferred sanction for offenses which may have little or
nothing in common with each other or with academic fitness. The
"death penalty" in this sense is, of course, expulsion. Its necessary
effect is to terminate the individual's academic status, even though
the offense to which the sanction is tied represents neither academic
failure nor academic misconduct on the student's part.
If the student has failed to perform minimally acceptable aca-
demic work, or if he has violated fundamental standards respecting
the integrity of that work (as by plagiarism or cheating), it may
not be inappropriate for the college to reconsider his fitness as a
scholar. If his misbehavior is more essentially in the abuse of some
privilege he entertains as a resident or citizen on campus, however,
surely it may be better to fashion deterrent or corrective sanctions
which adequately respond to that variety of misconduct but which
do not terminate his academic status. Suppose, for instance, that
the college maintains a bowling alley in the student union, and that
47 See 3 HARV. LEGAL COMM. 1 (1966).
VOL. 45
STUDENT AS UNIVERSITY RESIDENT
a given student badly abuses the equipment. Is it really appropriate
to regard this as so far reflecting on his scholarship that one should
seriously consider suspending him - action which keeps him not
merely from the recreational facility he has abused but from the
classroom from which he may need further benefit and where he
has not misconducted himself? Shouldn't a suspension of his bowling
privileges, rather than his educational interests, be more responsive?
If the misconduct is aggravated, wouldn't it still be better to require
either that he make monetary restitution for the damage he has
done or, if he lacks funds, that he be obliged to work off the cost
of the repair than to suspend or expel him from the college with
all the crippling effects that these penalties may have?
The suggestion for a more discriminating treatment of dis-
ciplinary sanctions, reserving the academic sanction only for aca-
demic offenses except in the extraordinary case of residential
misbehavior which is so repeated that its repetition finally requires
removal of the student, can be readily expanded. The student
determined to have violated a rule respecting drinking in the dormi-
tories may surely be adequately rebuked and others adequately
deterred by the temporary suspension of significant social privileges.
One might even be so enlightened as to suggest some counselling
-even to require it if drinking appears to be a regular problem
for the student. Whatever his offense to the rules and mores of the
dormitory, however, it is difficult to see the wisdom of suspending
him with its necessary effect of withdrawing educational oppor-
tunities.
Even in the aggravated "residential" case, e.g., the case of a
student chronically raucous in a dormitory, the offense is more
accurately to others in the dormitory and it may, at most, be more
responsive to evict him merely from that facility than to evict him
from the classrooms as well, where he has committed no offense.
To be sure, the student may endure a degree of hardship in finding
lodgings elsewhere - but not so much as though the university gave
him no opportunity to try as by expelling him.
There is no point in proliferating examples or illustrating still
further varieties of disciplinary responses beyond the tired, harsh,
and inessential preference for suspension or expulsion, but there may
be some point in bringing the matter back to our subject of the
student as resident. To the very extent that a student's offense is
dehors the academic process and is indeed an offense only against
the nonacademic, social, residential aspects of the college com-
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munity, a response not needlessly jeopardizing the student's aca-
demic career should surely be found.48
V. CAMPUS DISORDERS
The anticipated conclusion to this article was interrupted as
a result of a massive student vigil which developed in support of
a strike by the nonacademic employees at Duke University. The
ensuing month was wholly occupied by efforts to resolve the dispute,
and the manuscript remained unfinished at the time this symposium
was held in Denver. In the course of the symposium itself, it be-
came even clearer that student interests had expanded well beyond
conventional concerns for student freedom and that a growing
number of universities were more urgently concerned with developing
ways and means to cope with extralegal and illegal direct student
action aimed at two newer objectives: first, modification of pro-
grams within the university itself; second, use of the university as
an instrumentality of social change in the outside community.
Major confrontations at a number of universities within the
past 3 years and similar conflicts that must realistically be antici-
pated elsewhere in the immediate future, surely suggest that some
effort should be made in this symposium to treat these new dimen-
sions of student power. While this issue is not one where a law
professor has any special claim (especially since neither the student
mode of action nor the acconmnodations they seek are typically
grounded in any legal claim), still something useful might be
offered even by way of amateur observation. In lieu of the ordinary
conclusion, and drawing from significantly related sources such
as the Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Dis-
orders, as well as from reports made within a number of the uni-
versities thus far involved in these confrontations, I would offer the
following suggestions.
The accommodation of extralegal crises on campus seems to
me to involve three stages of concern of which the most important
(and the most neglected) is the first stage: (1) the avoidance of
extralegal conflict; (2) the response to unavoidable conflict; and
(3) provision for the immediate and long term aftermath. Much
as the Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Dis-
48 The point is further developed in UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY, REPORT OF THE SEN-
ATE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON STUDENT AFFAIRS 5 (Dec. 9, 1966) (mimeographed):
"In formulating the recommendations which follow, the Committee first identified
five separate areas of student-university contract: 1) the student as a scholar, 2) the
student as a tenant, 3) the student as a member of a student organization, 4) the
student as an employee, and 5) the student as a customer for goods and services.
Only in the first of these areas can the University appropriately apply its distinctive
disciplinary punishments (such as suspensions and expulsion) . See also Gold-
man, The University and The Liberty Of Its Students - A Fiduciary Theory, 54 KY.
L.J. 643 (1966).
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orders concludes that urban rioting resulted almost predictably from
the neglect of persistent community conditions, it also now appears
that a number of riotous student demonstrations might equally never
have materialized but for the neglect of certain institutional con-
ditions. As a matter of enlightened self-interest, large-scale institutions
might at least consider a number of steps open to them, both for their
own merits as well as for the defusing of radical movements.
(1) Careful, systematic, and joint student-administrative-faculty
review of basic institutional practices, policies, and structures, with
immediate attention to any matters which have been the subject of
persistent rumor or complaint. There is doubtless some real basis
for the student view that our large-scale institutions have grown
without any particular direction or philosophy. The absence of any
readily available, responsive, working, representative, and respected
group with influence and concern has surely contributed to the felt
need for dramatic direct action. There is reason to believe that the
special appointment of representative ad hoc bodies granted special
influence may be necessary at least for the short term.
(2) Revitalizing of established means influentially to express
grievances and effect recommendations. Student governments may
have failed in the main because they are correctly perceived as "jock-
strap" governments, play parliaments which lack authority, which
are identified by impotence, which turn off the socially estranged
student, and which therefore cannot be expected to serve as a steam
valve which students will use harmlessly to ventilate their concerns.
For student government to "work" it must almost certainly be
granted nontrivial responsibility. A profile of its representatives need
to be included in regular university decisionmaking bodies, both for
the positive inputs they can provide and for the value of their own
informal feedback to the student body.
(3) Revitalization of faculty participation. Faculty senates or
councils must themselves be restored to influential authority with
full participating membership on all major university committees.
Such schemes already exist as a matter of form at many institutions,
of course, and a great deal of the difficulty here is not one of
structure but incentive. It is currently unrealistic to expect significant
faculty service in the policy and planning aspects of large-scale
institutions to the extent that such service proceeds on the faculty
member's own time, receives no tangible recognition, distracts from
publication or teaching, and thus confronts each faculty member
purely as a "sacrifice." In short, incentives must simply be reordered
to include institutional service if essential, competent, and responsible
faculty participation is to be secured.
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(4) Revision of clear and defensible rules on matters of sub-
stance and procedure. The typical lack of college rules clearly and
fairly defining permissible and impermissible forms of action, the
use of draconian "good conduct" rules, and the lack of fair and
respected disciplinary procedures doubtless engender some contempt,
a great deal of confusion, and a complete inability to cope with
real conflict when it does arise. The inertia of colleges systematically
to review their rules systems is, in my opinion, more responsible
than any other single factor for the trend toward judicial inter-
vention in student-college relations.
Urgent attention to long-neglected problems, improved com-
munication to identify problems, to dispel rumors, and to benefit
from inputs and feedbacks, the increased sharing of nontrivial
responsibility with a reordering of incentives to make faculty par-
ticipation useful, and the reformulation of rules to achieve fairness
and credibility are minimal steps easily within the capacity of most
universities to pursue at once. Because of the always present likeli-
hood that an unforeseen confrontation may develop in spite of
these measures, the college should of course make provision for
emergency meetings with student, faculty, administrative, trustee,
and employee organizations on very short notice. Otherwise, mis-
information is bound to spread and dramatic direct action is more
likely to materialize to fill the vacuum.
The second level of concern is with the crisis that occurs in
spite of one's best efforts to alleviate grievances and provide orderly
means of change. The management of such crises becomes a matter
of strategy, of course, but fairness and credibility are themselves
the most critical elements of a strategy determined to minimize the
conflict.
(1) Cautious and Firm Initial Reaction. Gross overreaction
to trivial rules' violations has generally resulted in an enlargement
of the crisis by submerging the original issue beneath a newer issue
of brutality and unfairness. An announced willingness promptly to
review the issue sponsored by the ad hoc group, with a request that
it be placed in those decision-sharing bodies regularly established
(as suggested supra), plus firm reference to the need for deliberate
review rather than unconsidered action based solely on unilateral
pressure, and a reference to the consequences of anarchy both in
terms of its inherent inconsistency with the academic process and its
seriousness under fair rules established with participation by the
student body, may give the demonstration pause or at least isolate
it and deprive it of means to secure broad support. Firmness in the
use of principled sanctions must be maintained, however, if the
basic and wholly defensible request for minimum order is to achieve
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respect and credibility. While reasonable persons may disagree, I
have seen little evidence that abusive force can be let go without
the use of sanctions credible enough to indicate that the commitment
to basic order is itself strongly felt and will not be set aside simply
to avoid unpleasantness. Where possible, infractions of the rules
should be noticed and cases processed through established pro-
cedures, without more. A sensible rules system will, however, also
provide for interim suspension (subject always to orderly review)
when, in the judgment of the highest administrative officer, the
safety of others or the maintenance of minimum order requires it.
If the personnel resources of the institution are manifestly insuffi-
cient to cope with those who would clearly paralyze the institution
unless removed, then it may be reasonable as a last recourse that
the students answer to the law, as may any other citizen, through
the use of an ex parte injunction and requests for assistance from
the police, with a credible followthrough willingness to sign com-
plaints and attend the civil courts.
The third stage, the aftermath, may itself fall into three parts.
The first of these is the followthrough with respect to alleged
rules' violations and infractions of law to determine the appropriate
treatment of each participant and the conditions under which he
may resume his academic career. The second is to review the subject
of the crisis itself, both in terms of the possible merit of the
grievance it sought to dramatize and what it may indicate in terms
of a larger structural inadequacy that gave rise to such disorderly
action. And the third is to review the institution's overall situation
in light of stresses or weaknesses uncovered in the confrontation
which has just transpired. The last is doubtless as important as any-
thing else, if an unfortunate history is not to repeat itself.
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